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Abstract—Security and privacy of data-in-transit are critical issues in Industry 4.0 which are further amplified by the use of faster com-
munication technologies such as 6G. Along with security issues, computation and communication costs, as well as data confidentiality,
must be also accommodated. In this work, we design a cybertwin-based cloud-centric network architecture to improve the flexibility and
scalability of 6G industrial networks. Cybertwin not only enables the deployment of advanced security solutions but also provides an
always-on connection. However, the security of data-in-transit over wireless communication between users/things and cybertwin remains
a concern. Hence, a privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on digital signature and authenticated key exchange protocol is
designed to address the security concerns of data exchanged. Additionally, we conduct a security analysis that proves that the scheme
resists several attacks in the industry 4.0 environment. Moreover, the evaluation performed confirmed the superiority of the proposed
work comparing to the existing works.
Index Terms—Cybertwin, 6G, Industry 4.0, Authentication, Privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
INdustry 4.0 is one of the benefits of the development of Wire-less Sensor Networking (WSN) technologies in the industry.
Through deploying and using WSNs in industries, optimizing
the production line becomes possible with energy efficiency,
fault prediction, better quality management, product planning,
and resource prediction. Today, the development of smart
devices and applications as well as advance in the network
technology involved in various fields lead to the development
of the digital industry, assisting industrial production with
information and communication technologies. Industry 4.0,
through Artificial Intelligence (AI) and next-generation com-
munication and technology, can gain intelligent connections of
end-users, data, processes, and things for making more relevant
networked connections [1]. However, the vast array of sensor
nodes/smart devices embedded in industry 4.0 applications
has resulted in an explosive growth in the degree of inter-
connectivity and amount of data being processed.
The evolution of 6G networks can effectively mitigate some
of these problems. Integration of 6G wireless network and in-
dustry 4.0 enables devices to communicate to a new level within
intelligent environments, through connected smart sensors over
the Internet. The 6G wireless network will extend the scale of
industry 4.0 coverage by offering the fastest communication
and connection density of massive bandwidth [2]. As men-
tioned in [3], the industry 4.0 revolution will be completely re-
alized with 6G. It provides cost-effective and efficient Internet-
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based diagnostics, maintenance, operation, and direct machine
connections by overcoming the boundaries and bridging the
gap between the physical factory and the cyber computational
environment. However, interfacing 6G-Industry 4.0 poses some
challenges for security and privacy of data, trusted communica-
tion, computational complexity and cost in the aspects of data
storage and data processing.
Besides, with the fast development of IoT and its appli-
cations, the ever-increasing Internet traffic and services bring
unprecedented challenges, such as scalability, security, mobil-
ity, privacy and availability, which cannot be addressed by
the current network architectures [4]. In the existing IP-based
Internet architecture, demands of different devices and service
dramatically increasing since IP address used for both identity
and locator of the device attached to the network. This happen
leads to the scalability problem. Moreover, network resource
allocation and coordination among network service providers
in order to ensure high Quality of Service (QoS) is difficult
such that it leads to availability issue. In terms of network
trustworthiness and security, the current IP-based Internet ar-
chitecture relies on the safety of the end-to-end connections
as well as user trustworthy. All such challenging issues in the
present network architecture are vital and strictly impede the
fast-growing services developments.
To meet the ever-increasing demands, handling the big data
generated by IoT devices, and network resource sharing, cloud
computing is an appealing strategy [5]. However, it could not
be relied upon where a minor delay in data processing may
lead to unfavorable outcomes and risky effects. Furthermore,
its performance and scalability are still restricted owing to ig-
noring the network edge processing ability. Besides, the issue of
mobility support is not usually considered for accommodating
the increasing demands of services and tools. Edge computing
integrated into industry 4.0 is one of the better solutions that
can locally conduct many tasks rather than getting them pro-
cessed either in the remote server/cloud or end devices. Edge
computing introduces an extension of the cloud computing
paradigm with the advantages of better quality of service,
scalability, agility, decentralization, and efficiency. However, the
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challenges on availability and mobility are not solved in cloud
networking.
Given the existing challenges in presenting scalability, mo-
bility, security, and availability for industry 4.0 network archi-
tecture designs, we employ the cybertwin-based cloud-centric
network architecture. Cybertwin provides three functions such
that the communication assistant function is the most fun-
damental function [6]. By using this function, it obtains the
needed service from the network and then deliver the service
to the users/things. This network architecture can address the
mobility, scalability, and availability of industry 4.0 networks
[7]. Cybertwin also deploys the advanced security solutions.
Hence, it meets security since each data sending to the humans
and or things should traverse the cybertwin. It also can fulfill
user’s privacy by hiding the the users’ identity from the appli-
cation service providers. Although, cybertwin satisfies security
and privacy, however, due to the open-nature of wireless com-
munication employed between cybertwin and humans/things
in this network architecture, security and privacy of data trans-
mission over the public channel still remains open concerns in
this environment.
Motivated by the security shortcomings and challenges, we
design a secure scheme that ensure data will be exchanged
among involved entities in a secure way. To this end, we
design a privacy-preserving authentication scheme for secure
communication in heterogeneous systems. The scheme ensures
that only authorized users are able to access data collected from
the sensor nodes mounted in the industry 4.0 environment.
The main contributions of this study are as follows:
• We proposed a cloud-centric network based on cyber-
twin to provide scalability, mobility, and availability
for 6G-Industry 4.0 network by accommodation the
evolution from end-to-end connection to cloud-to-end
connection. For the proposed network architecture, we
developed an offloading strategy based on priority and
computation time.
• We developed an authentication protocol with privacy-
preserving based on digital signature and authenticated
key exchange in order to generate and share the session
key for dealing with illegitimate entities and ensure the
integrity of data.
• We used the broadly accepted random oracle model in
order to formally prove the security of our scheme. We
also test the safety of the proposed scheme by using the
Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA).
• We simulated our scheme using the iFogSim simulator.
The network throughput, end-to-end delay, and average
authentication delay are used as network performance
parameters. The detailed of obtained results indicate
that our scheme is practical with acceptable communi-
cation efficiency.
The rest of paper is as follows: Sections 2 presents the related
works. In Section 3, the relevant preliminaries are presented. In
Section 4 our scheme is presented. In Section 5, the correspond-
ing formal proof is given. In Section 6, the security analysis and
performance evaluation are presented. Section 7 represents a
practical perspective. The paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
The main area of this study is the existing works on solving the
authentication and privacy concerns on insecure communica-
tion in the industry 4.0 networks. In the following, we review
state-of-the-art works in this area.
In [8], a temporal-credential-based scheme based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) is developed for providing the
intractability feature. This scheme is facing some issues related
to function and security. For addressing the security issues
in [8], a three-factor authentication scheme is designed in [9].
This scheme ensures all the security features for WSN in IoT
network. For considering the fault tolerance in the biometric
information extracted from user, error-correction codes, and
fuzzy commitment scheme is adopted.
In [10], an ECC-based user authentication scheme is de-
signed by for future applications of IoT. This scheme how-
ever needs higher costs of computation and communication
in comparison with other non-ECC-based schemes. A secure
light three-factor user authentication protocol for hierarchi-
cal IoT networks is presented in [11]. Password, smart card,
and personal biometric information are three factors used
in this scheme. In order to make a secure communication,
they used cryptographic hash function and symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption method.
A user authentication scheme based on chaotic-map is
designed in [12] applicable to the e-healthcare systems. The
chaotic map-based operations have a lightweight nature in
comparison with other public key-based cryptosystems such
as, ECC and Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA). This scheme also
employs fuzzy extractor to verify user biometric. This scheme
meets user anonymity. In [13], a remote user authentication
scheme based on key establishment protocol is proposed. This
protocol utilized for smart home environment. In this study,
the focus is on the security of data transmitted between users
and smart devices. To this purpose, a session key for secure
communication between the user and smart device will be
generated with the help of a gateway node.
As explained in [14], in the cybertwin-based edge com-
puting architecture, the edge servers are more vulnerable to
different attacks than cloud servers. Accordingly, they used the
combination of blockchain and cybertwin to guarantee that the
computing tasks of the edge nodes are completed accurately
and appropriately returned to the end-user. However, they
didn’t consider security of communication between end-user
and edge nodes and it remains still a security issue. In [6], a
network architecture based on cybertwin is proposed. Authors
described that user’s privacy can be protected by cybertwin. In
this network architecture, the end-user will be obtained services
via the cybertwin and user’s authentication will be verified by
cybertwin. All user’s behaviours will be logged by cybertwin.
However, in this network, the lower layer is based on the
IP layer and hence, security and privacy on communication
between lower and upper layers still remain the main concern.
Considering the network architectures, the lack of scalable
and flexible architecture, as well as always-on connection, is
the main challenge in data-based industry 4.0 environments.
Besides, the presence of active and passive adversaries in the
network threatens the security and privacy of data exchanged
between entities. Based on available knowledge, there is a lack
of an efficient scheme that considers the security of data-in-
transit for this network architecture. Given the big data gener-
ated in the large-scale network, computation and communica-
tion cost of security scheme also remains the most important
challenges in industry 4.0.
3 PRELIMINARIES
Here, the main entities participated in the proposed scheme
are defined. Besides, we define threat models and security
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Figure 1: The cybertwin based cloud-centric network architec-
ture for 6G-Industry 4.0.
3.1 System Model
In this study, we developed a cybertwin based cloud-centric
network architecture for 6G-Industry 4.0 in where the core
cloud network is located in top layer and Mobile Edge Comput-
ing (MEC) servers are deployed on the edge of the network in
the middle layer (see Figure 1). The cybertwin as an intelligent
service agent of smart devices and users/operators is located
in the edge cloud [14]. It is assumed that each user is able to
access multiple MEC servers and each MEC server has a queue
of assigned tasks and can service only one user at the same
time and handle sensitive tasks. In the lower layer, all data
collected by things such as sensor nodes/smart devices will be
transferred to its cybertwin hosting.
In this network architecture, the intensive tasks can perform
locally on device and or offloaded the tasks to the MEC servers
or core cloud servers. When the required data is available on
the local device, there is no need to establish a connection with
cybertwin. Otherwise, a user needs to establish a connection to
its cybertwin hosting in order to access data and or services. The
cybertwin gets services/data from MEC servers and core cloud
and then offloads it to the best MEC server. Finally, it establishes
a connection between user and MEC server. Therefore, an
efficient strategy for offloading is required. Given the entities
involved in the proposed network architecture, this strategy
can be local offloading, MEC offloading, cloud offloading, and
gateway offloading.
3.1.1 Offloading Strategy
In this work, our focus is more on accessing the data by users
quickly and it is more important for real-time applications. To
this purpose, the computation time (T comtask ), transmission delay
(Dtratask), and queuing delay (D
que
task) are taken into account as






In the local offloading, the computation time for performing





where Γloc refers the number of CPU cycles needed to compute
the task and Floc is the local computing power of the local
device. In this situation, it is assumed that transmission delay
Dttask = 0, and queuing delay D
q
task = 0. For the local
processing, the total delay is TDloctask = T
c,loc
task .
In the MEC server offloading, a cybertwin selects the best
MEC server in order to access the requested data. In this strat-
















in which χch is the number of input data, Γmec is the number
of CPU cycles needed to compute the task, Fmec refers to the
local computing power of the MEC server, Tmecq refers to the
time that a task should be waiting in a queue to execute and
complete the prior and high priority tasks since prioritized
FIFO scheduling [16] is used in this work, Rch indicates the
total uplink transmission rate, Bch is the bandwidth of sub-
channel ch that is allocated for the task, SNRch = PtN refers to
signal-to-noise ratio that is ratio of transmission power Pt to
noise power N . In the MEC server, the total delay of offloading







Because of the limitation of MEC servers, they are unable to
store all data in their storage server. Therefore, it is possible
the requested data be unavailable in a MEC server. In this
situation, the cybertwin can request to offload the task to the
center cloud server through wireless network. The computation







, Dq,cldtask = T
cld
q (3)
where Γcld is the number of CPU cycles needed to compute the
task on cloud server, Fcld refers to the local computing power of
the cloud server, and T cldque refers to the time that a task should
be waiting in the queue of the cloud for executing. The total







As mentioned above, a task can perform locally and or can
offload to a MEC server, cloud server, and or gateway for
execution. We can give the total consumption as follows:
Ωtask = ω × TDloctask + (1− ω)× TDofftask (4)
where ω = 1 refers to the local execution, ω = 0 means
offloading the task to a destination and TDofftask is the total
computation task on the destination is calculated as follows:
TDofftask = α× TD
mec
task + (1− α)× TDcldtask (5)
where α = 1 indicates the task is performed on the MEC server
while α = 0 represents the task is executed on the cloud server.
In this study, the total time of execution task, transmission
delay, and waiting time in the queue is taken into account as
the optimization objective. The aim is to minimize this time.



























C1 : ω × T c,loctaski + (1− ω)×
(





C2 : ω ×Dt,loctaski + (1− ω)×
(





C3 : ω ×Dq,loctaski + (1− ω)×
(





C4 : ω ∈ {0, 1} , α ∈ {0, 1}
(7)
where C1, C2, and C3 respectively represent the maximum
computation delay, transmission delay, and queue delay that
cannot exceed T cmax, Dtmax, Dqmax. And, C4 reflects the com-
puting task offloading decision, which determines whether the
tasks are offloaded by MEC servers/cloud.
This network architecture supports users with mobility.
When a user moves to the new location, it needs to establishes
connection with its cybertwin through new access point. In this
network, connection between users and cybertwin and in addi-
tion between gateway and cybertwin is under 6G communica-
tion standard where it provides high data rate communication
system.
3.2 Security Requirements
In industry 4.0, because of the open-access technology used
for communication between cybertwin (CT), gateway (GW)
and user (U), attackers can obtain and tamper the data by
eavesdropping on the communication networks.
To tackle this concern, an efficient privacy-preserving au-
thentication scheme can be helpful. This security scheme
should be able to fulfill the key security requirements. In this
study, the most critical requirements are summarized below:
• Data/Message Integrity: The authorized entities should
be able to verify the integrity of the signed
data/message.
• Privacy-preserving: A third party should be unable to
extract the real identity and private information from
the user’s pseudo-identity and the real identity of au-
thorized users remain anonymous.
• Data Confidentiality: An adversary should be unable to
extract any information from the communicated data.
3.3 Threat Model
In this study, the Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model [17] is used to
analysis and prove security of the proposed scheme. An ad-
versary Λ is able to overhear and manipulate the messages ex-
changed among two entities over an insecure channel. Besides,
Λ can compromise the mobile device by using sophisticated
analysis attacks and extract the secret data of the user.
3.4 Fuzzy Extractor
The fuzzy extractor is a useful mechanism that uses bio-
metric information for user authentication. In this method,
to deal with physical attacks, the noisy data extracted from
the biometric data of the user will be used to generate the
cryptographic keys [18]. A {M,me, l, τ, ε}-fuzzy extractor is
made up by two functions Gen and Rep as probabilistic
generation and deterministic reproduction, respectively. Gen
outputs (RU , PU ) on input biometric data BIOU ∈ M where
RU ∈ {0, 1}l is a secret string and PU is a auxiliary string
such that for any distribution W on M of min-entropy me
the statistical distance SD ((RU , PU ) , (Ul, PU )) < ε. Here, Ul
is the uniform distribution string with length l. And, Rep
outputs and recovers the secret string RU given the BIO
′
U






< τ . Here, BIO
′
U is
biometric information collected from user U such that dis-
tance between BIO
′











≥ 1 − εfn, where εfn is “false
negative” probability. In contrast, the distance between bio-
metric data BIOU1 and BIOU2 collected from U1 and U2 is
high with high probability Pr
[




1− εfp, such that τ
′
> τ and εfp means “false positive.”
4 OUR SCHEME: A PRIVACY-PRESERVING AUTHENTI-
CATION SCHEME
The data collected by sensor nodes and/or smart devices
and stored in the MEC storage servers should be transferred
securely to the users. To this end, we employed the symmetric
encryption algorithm since it is quite fast and efficient to secure
communication between user and cybertwin. However, the
secret key distribution is one of the main concerns in symmetric
algorithms. In this work, we designed a digital signature to
share confidential the session key generated by cybertwin. We
proved that the entities utilized in the proposed framework are
able to communicate securely. Here, we explain our scheme in
details.
4.1 Phase I - Initialization Phase
In this phase, Trusted Authority (TA) generates the system pa-
rameters and then release it to all legal entities in the network.
Let two primes p, q; group G of order q; and the distinct genera-
tor P ∈ G. It selects an integer s ∈ Z∗q as the master private key
with at least 160 bits at random. TA calculates the appropriate
public key Ppub = s.P by using the master private key. It
also selects a secure one-way hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
and sets SysPara = {p, q, Eq(a, b), G, P, Ppub, h} as parameters
of the system in order to publish to the core clouds, cyber-
twin, MEC servers, users and gateway/smart hubs wherein
Ep (a, b) : y





mod q 6= 0.
4.2 Phase II - Registration Phase
Here, the registration of cybertwin and user is accomplished by
TA.
Cybertwin: Let CCT = {CT1, CT2, · · · , CTk} as a set of
cybertwins contributed to the network. Each CTi has a real
identity IDCTi , private key SKCTi ∈ Z∗q , public key PKCTi =
SKCTi .P and a master secret key XCTi .
User: Let UU = {U1, U2, · · · , Un} be authorized users in
the network. TA has a database that contains personal de-
tails of users in the UU . Each user in this list i.e. Ui has
a private key SKUi ∈ Z∗q , public key PKUi = SKUi .P is
known by TA. For each user, TA selects IDUi and PWDUi
as real identity and password, respectively and finally sends
Yi = {IDUi , PWDUi , s} to the Ui in a secure manner. To
this end, TA signs SGN(Yi) and sends the encrypted mes-
sage Zi = EncPKUi {Yi, SGNSKTA(Yi)} to the user. Upon
receiving Zi, it will be decrypted by Ui in order to obtain
{IDUi , PWDUi , s}. Besides, PKTA will be used to verify the
signature. By using fuzzy extractor and input biometric data
BIOU , each user U extracts RU and PU as its biometric infor-
mation stored in the mobile device. Then, U randomly selects
a number rU , and calculates HPWU = h(PWDU ‖ rU ). Fi-
nally, user submits the registration request (IDU , HPWU , RU )
to its cybetwin host through a secure way. Once receiving a
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request for registration from the user U , its cybertwin checks
whether IDU is in the database. If exist, the user needs
to choose a new identity. Otherwise, cybertwin calculates
B1 = h(IDU ‖ HPWU ‖ RU ), B2 = h(IDU ‖ XCT )
where XCT is master secret key selected by cybertwin, and
B3 = h(HPWU ‖ RU ) ⊕ B2. Finally, the cybertwin sends the
data (B1, B3, X) to U via a secure way. Upon obtaining the
parameters, U stores (PU , rU , B1, B3, X,Gen(.), Rep(.)) into the
mobile device.
4.3 Phase III - Authentication Phase
In the designed network architecture, the communication be-
tween end-users/things and cybertwin (U-CT) is still based
on mobile IP. Because of the open nature of U-CT wireless
communication, we focus on the security of this communication
and explain the authentication in the following.
U-CT COMMUNICATION: In this work, the U-CT communi-
cation is via a symmetric encryption method since it is quite
fast and efficient. To establish a secure session communication
between U and CT , it is essential to create a session/secret key
SEKU−CT . Since the cybertwin is a fully-trusted entity, it is
responsible to generate the session key and share with user.
In order to establish this communication, a user has to send
a login request to its cybertwin host. Along with this request,
the user sends the gateway identity IDGW that needs it’s
data. Once the cybertwin received this request, it checks user
authentication first and then generates a session key SEKU−CT
and share with the authorized user. Upon receiving this key,
user can start communication with its cybertwin host and
other cybertwins as well as MEC servers using a symmetric
encryption algorithm such as Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) via a secure manner. This is mainly because the generated
session key not only will be sent to the user but also will be
shared with all cybertwin hosts, MEC servers, and core cloud
servers.
To this purpose and in order user authentication, the user
U imprints BIO
′
U as its biometric information by using a fuzzy
extractor and identity IDU and password PWDU as inputs.
It calculates B
′
1 = h(IDU ‖ h(PWDU ‖ rU ) ‖ RU ) where
RU = Rep(BIO
′




= B1. If it does
not hold, the mobile device rejects the login request. This is
because, at least one factor of biometrics RU , identity IDU ,
and password PWDU is not valid. Otherwise, if it holds, U
randomly selects a number xu ∈ Z∗q , and calculates B2 =
B3 ⊕ h (h (PWDU ‖ rU ) ‖ RU ), D1 = xu.P , D2 = xu.PKCT ,
PIDU = IDU ⊕ h(D2), and D3 = h (B2 ‖ D2). Finally, the
login request M1 = {D1, D3, T1} will be signed by user and
submit to its cybertwin host where T1 is the current timestamp.
In order to sign the M1, user by its mobile device computes
the corresponding signature by Equation 8. Then, user sends
{PIDU ,M1, σu} to its cybertwin host.
σu = SKU + s.h (PIDU ‖M1) (8)
Upon receiving the login request, cybertwin needs to verify
the signature. This verification ensures that the user is not
attempting to disseminate false messages and or impersonate
other authorized and legitimate users. It first checks whether
timestamp T1 is fresh. If not, it rejects the request. Otherwise, it
verifies whether
σu.P = PKU + Ppub.h (PIDU ‖M1) (9)
holds or not. If so, cybertwin checks whether ID
′
U = PIDU ⊕
h(D
′
2) is in the database where D
′























Start secure communication by using SKU-CT
Figure 2: Process of authentication and session key generation





= D3. The request is terminated by the cybertwin
if D
′
3 6= D3. Otherwise, the cybertwin calculates D4 = xc.P ,
SEKU−CT = h(D1 ‖ D4 ‖ xc.D1), D5 = h(ID
′
U ‖ D1 ‖
D4 ‖ B
′
2), and then submits the message M2 = {D4, D5, T2}
to U where T2 is the current timestamp. Before submission,
cybertwin signs the message M2. To this end, cybertwin com-
pute the signature by using Equation 10. Then, cybertwin sends
{IDCT ,M2, σct} to user.
σct = SKCT + s.h (IDCT ‖M2) (10)
When getting the message M2, user has to verify the signa-
ture of the message. It firstly checks whether timestamp T2 is
fresh. If not, it rejects the request. Otherwise, it verifies whether
σct.P = PKCT + Ppub.h (IDCT ‖M2) (11)
hold or not. If it is established, user calculates D
′
5 = h(IDU ‖




= D5. The session is terminated
if it does not hold. Otherwise, the cybertwin is authenticated
by U . Then, the mobile device calculates SEK
′
U−CT = h(D1 ‖
D4 ‖ xu.D4) and start secure communication with its cybertwin
till the session key is valid. If the user moves to a new position,
it is required the user connects to its cybertwin host through
a new access point. During the movement, as long as the
session key is valid, all communication is through symmetric
encryption. Once the session key is expired, it needs to perform
the above procedure for generating a new session key. Figure 2
shows the process of authentication between end-user and its
cybertwin host.
5 FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION
Here, with the random oracle model [19], we first prove that
our scheme is secure. Next, we test the safety of our scheme
against the passive/active adversaries by using AVISPA.
Definition 1: The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is as
follows. Consider two random number P,Q ∈ G where Q = x.P
and x ∈ Z∗q . Given the DLP, computing x from Q is hard.
Theorem 1: scheme is secure under random oracle for industry
4.0 environment network.
Proof : Consider a security model is established by CH
and Λ as challenger and adversary, respectively. Λ can forge
{PIDi,Mi, σi}. Let the game between CH and Λ can solve DLP
by running Λ with a non-negligible probability. It is supposed
that CH keeps ListH1 , and ListH2 as hash lists which are
initialized to empty.
Setup: CH randomly chooses s and compute Ppub = s.P as
public key. Besides, CH sends params = {p, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2}
as systeme parameters to Λ.
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H1-Oracle: CH keeps ListH1 contains the tuples 〈Mi, σ〉. By
performing the H1 query with message M , created by Λ, CH
checks whether the tuple 〈M,σ〉 exists in the ListH1 . If so, CH
returns σ = H1 (Mi) to Λ; otherwise, CH randomly chooses
σ ∈ Z∗q and adds 〈Mi, σ〉 into the ListH1 . Finally, CH sends
σ = H1 (Mi) to Λ.
H2-Oracle: CH keeps a list (ListH2) with the form of
〈PIDi,Mi, σ〉. By performing a H2 query by Λ with the mes-
sage 〈PIDi,Mi, σ〉, CH checks whether the tuple 〈PIDi,M, σ〉
is in the ListH2 . If exist, CH sends σ = H2 (PIDi,Mi) to Λ. If
not exist, CH randomly selects σ ∈ Z∗q and adds {PIDi,Mi, σ}
into the ListH2 . Finally, CH sends σ = H2 (PIDi,Mi) to Λ.
Sign-Oracle: Upon receiving a query created by Λ with the
message Mi, CH generates two random numbers αi,σi ∈ Z∗q
and chooses two random point PIDi and PKi. Then, CH adds
〈PIDi,Mi, αi〉 into the ListH2 . Next, CH sends 〈PIDi,Mi, τi〉
to Λ. It is easy to verify the equation σi.P = PKi +
Ppub.h (PIDi ‖Mi) is established. Therefore, the generated sig-
natures by CH from signatures generated by authorized users
are indistinguishable. Lastly, Λ gives a message 〈PIDi,Mi, σi〉
and CH checks whether σi.P = PKi + Ppub.h (PIDi ‖Mi) is
established. If not, the process will be aborted by CH.












, the signatures σi = SKi + s.h (PIDi ‖Mi)
and σ
′
i = SKi + s.h
′
(PIDi ‖Mi) where h 6= h
′
are produced










mod q as the answer of the DLP.
Since solving the DLP is contradict to the hardness of DLP,
hence, our scheme is secure against the alternatively chosen
message attack in the random oracle model. As a result, our
scheme provides message authentication for the designed net-
work architecture.
Theorem 2: (Message Integrity) signature of the message guar-
antees the message integrity.
Proof : As explained in Theorem 1, our scheme is secure
against a chosen message attack in the random oracle model.
Therefore, an attacker is unable to forge valid signatures.
Theorem 3: (Privacy-Preserving) an adversary is unable to
extract the real identity of user from its pseudonym.
Proof : Ui transmits message {PIDU ,Mi, σi} to its cyber-
twin host, where PIDU = IDU ⊕ h(xu.PKCT ). The real
identity IDU is perfectly concealed since PIDU is an unknown
identity with a random number xu. Based on the DLP, it is hard
to compute xu through PIDU and PKCT . Hence, the adversary
is unable to obtain IDU . As a result, our scheme fulfils privacy-
preserving.
Theorem 4: (Data Confidentiality) all data are confidential
against an adversary.
Proof : All data-in-transit for a session between user U and
its cybertwin CT are encrypted using the established session
key SEKU−CT . This provides end-to-end encryption whereby
an attacker is listening to the traffics will only be able to capture
the encrypted data. As long as a well-established and secure
symmetric encryption scheme (i. e. AES) is used, it is infeasible
for an adversary to learn any information from the encrypted
data.
5.1 Security Verification
AVISPA, as a popular tool, is used to examine the security pro-
tocol versus active or passive adversaries. The security protocol
within the formal manner can be verified by using AVISPA.
%OFMC
SUMMARY
   SAFE
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   OFMC
COMMENTS
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   parseTime   : 0.00s
   searchTime  : 0.05s
   visitedNodes: 3 nodes
   depth       : 6 plies
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SUMMARY
   SAFE
Backend
   CL-AtSe
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   Analysed   : 2 states
   Reachable  : 2 states
   Translation: 0.06 seconds
   Computation: 0.00 seconds
Figure 3: The results of OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends.
Table 1: Experimental Specifications.
Operations Symbol Operation time
Scalar-point multiplication Tsm 0.013 ms
One-way hash function Th 0.035 ms
Message authentication code Tmac 0.074 ms
ECC point multiplication Tecc 0.430 ms
Encryption operation Tenc 0.043 ms
Decryption operation Tdec 0.059 ms
Bitwise XOR operation Txor 0.009 ms
Table 2: Performance Comparisons.
Ref. Computation Cost Commu. Cost
[20] 19Th + 8Txor + 6Tsm 340 Bytes
[21] 30Th + 16Txor 482 Bytes
[22] 31Th + 20Txor + 4Tsm 232 Bytes
[23] 14Th + 8Txor 340 Bytes
Our Scheme 14Th + 3Txor + 7Tsm 128 Bytes
Table 3: Experiment Parameters.
Parameter Value
Channel bandwidth 4 MHZ
Number of channels 10
Size of task 1 - 4 MB
Range of operands for task 500–2000 Megacycle
CPU cycle 0.1 - 1 GHZ
MEC server clock frequency 10 GHZ
Cloud server clock frequency 100 GHZ
We have modelled our scheme utilizing the AVISPA via High-
Level Security Protocol Language (HLPSL) and the user’s role
specifications, gateway and cybertwin. Then, we simulated
the presented outline utilizing the Security Protocol ANimator
(SPAN) and the simulation results are summarized in Figures
3 under two extensively-utilized back-ends integrated into
AVISPA namely Constraint Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-
AtSe) and On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC).
6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Here, we assess the performance of our scheme by making a
comparison with [20], [21], [22], and [23] by considering the
computation cost and communication cost.
Computation Cost: We measure the operation time of cryp-
tographic operations by executing the benchmark on Linux
host using Intel Core i7-980X processor laptop with CPU speed
3.3 GHz as testbed. We also measure the execution time of
operation on To this end, we use the JPBC library Pbc-05.14, and
the JCE library. Table 1 represents the experiment specifications,
including the computational specifications.
Communication Cost: For the convenience, we supposed
the length of gateway identity IDGW , cybertwin IDCT , output
of hash function h(.), random number x ∈ Z∗q are 160 bits,
whereas the length of user identity IDU , timestamps, and size
of each element P ∈ G are 80 bits, 32 bits, and 320 bits, respec-
tively [24], [25]. The block size of the cryptography of AES, as
the symmetric encryption algorithm applied in our scheme, is
equal to 128 bits [26]. Table 2 represents the performance of our


































Figure 4: Time latency
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Figure 5: Overall accuracy
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Figure 7: End-to-End delay
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Figure 8: Network throughput
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Figure 9: Authentication delay
7 PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE
We simulate the integrated architecture using iFogSim [27]. It
provides a full-stack environment for modelling and simulation
in the edge and fog computing environment [28]. iFogSim is
used to model the interactions across all layers of the IoT
architecture. In this work, a real-life scenario with 1 gateway, 5
MEC servers, and 2 cloud servers is simulated. The simulation
takes average of 30 minutes on a Linux host using Intel Core
i7-980X, 3.33GHz.
7.1 Offloading Evaluation
Here, we evaluate our strategy for task offloading by making a
comparison with strategy that used in [29] named ”JOOA” by
considering time latency under different number of tasks. To
this end, inspired by the work in [29], we set some parameters
aiming to reflect a scenario as much realistic as possible (see
Table 3). We measure the time latency versus different numbers
of intensive tasks for our strategy and JOOA.
Figure 4 clearly shows time latency is increasing as the
number of tasks increases. As we can see in this figure, the
time latency for our strategy and JOOA are almost the same but
when the number of tasks is increasing, the difference between
these values increases and it is lower for our strategy. Because
of the importance of real-time tasks in industry 4.0 network,
this comparison proves that our strategy is more efficient and
effective.
7.2 Authentication Scheme Evaluation
In the Industry 4.0 network environment, especially in real-
time applications, accessing the required data/services securely
and efficiently with the least possible delay has a vital role
in the system performance. In this work, we first evaluate
the accuracy and False Positive Ratio (FPR) of our scheme
under the DY threat model. Then, we use three indexes to see
the practicality of communication: End-to-End Delay (E2ED),
Network THRoughput (NTHR), and average authentication
delay.
Accuracy: Here, the overall accuracy is considered as a percent-
age of the total number of correct outcomes and results. It is
measured by the standard formula as follows [25]:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
(12)
where TP , TN , FP and FN refer to the number of true
positive, true negative, false positive and false negative, re-
spectively. As shown in Figure 5, the average accuracy of our
scheme is 89% under the different percentages of attackers who
participated in the network.
FPR: In this work, FPR is used to prove the validity of our
scheme to detect forged messages. It is measured by the stan-





where FP refers to the number of forged messages incorrectly
detected as valid messages and TN is the number of forged
messages correctly detected by our scheme. As shown in Figure
6, the average of FPR is about 4% with the different percentages
of attackers that inject forged messages.
End-to-End Delay: It is a network performance parameter that
is defined as the time taken for a packet to be transmitted




i=1 (Tri − Tsi)
N
(14)
where Tri and Tsi respectively refer to receiving and sending
time of packet i and N is the total number of packets.
Figure 7 shows that E2ED values for our scheme, [20], [21],
[22], and [23], during the authentication process, are respec-
tively 0.041ms, 0.057ms, 0.052ms, and 0.036ms. As we can see,
E2ED for [23] is less than our scheme, [20], [21] and [22]. This
because the size of messages for [23] is less than our scheme
and other comparable schemes.
Network Throughput: It is also an important network per-
formance parameter which is defined as the number of bits





where Nr is the total number of received packet, |Pkt| refers to
the size of each packet and Td is total time.
Figure 8 shows that the value of throughput for our scheme
is less than [20], [22], and [23] because our scheme uses less-
sized messages during the authentication phases. The through-
put value for [21] is less than our scheme, however, our scheme
8
provides better security and more functionality features.
Average Authentication Delay: We use this parameter to show
the impact of 6G, 5G and 4G as wireless communication tech-
nologies on authentication process. In the 6G-Industry 4.0, the
typical value of link latency is 1ms, whereas it is 5ms in 5G-
Industry 4.0 network. With this assumption, we evaluate the
average authentication delay under different rates of request
(per second) and different time for authentication request ser-
vice. We also explore the average authentication delay with
link latency= 20ms which is a typical value in 4G systems. As
we can see in Figure 9, the average delay experienced by an
authentication request varies with the rate of requests for link
latency= 5ms and 20ms.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have designed a cybertwin based cloud-centric
network architecture for 6G-Industry 4.0 network to provide
scalability, mobility, security and availability. Because of the vi-
tal role of tasks and data offloading, an efficient offloading strat-
egy was proposed to support the network architecture. Besides,
given the open-nature of wireless communication between end-
users/things and cybertwin, we have developed a authenti-
cation scheme based on digital signature and authenticated
key exchange with privacy-preserving. This scheme ensures
the integrity of data-in-transit. The formal proof analysis has
proved that the proposed scheme is secure and robust against
DY threat model. Furthermore, the comparison with the related
work proves the effectiveness of the work in terms of security
and performance.
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